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ABSTRACT	:	According	to	Robert	Talisse,	‘we	have	sufficient	epistemological	reasons	to	be	democrats’	and	these	reasons	support	democracy	even	when	we	are	tempted	to	doubt	the	legitimacy	of	democratic	government.		As	epistemic	agents,	we	care	about	the	truth	of	our	beliefs,	and	have	reasons	to	want	to	live	in	an	environment	conducive	to	forming	and	acting	on	true,	rather	than	false,	beliefs.	Democracy,	Talisse	argues,	is	the	best	means	to	provide	such	an	environment.	Hence,	he	concludes	that	epistemic	agency,	correctly	understood,	supports	the	legitimacy	of	democracy.		This	reply	highlights	the	interest,	but	also	the	difficulties,	of	this	argument	and,	in	particular,	of	its	assumptions	about	epistemic	agency,	morality	and	democracy.				
KEYWORDS:	democracy,	epistemic	agency,	justice,	morality,	Talisse	*Email:	annabelle.lever@unige.ch		……………………………………………………….		Why	should	we	seek	democratic	means	to	change	decisions	that	strike	us	as	so	gravely	wrong	that	they	threaten	the	legitimacy	of	democratic	government?		The	answer,	according	to	Robert	Talisse,	is	that	we	each	have	sufficient	epistemic	reasons	to	favour	democratic	over	undemocratic	forms	of	government,	and	therefore	to	accept	the	moral	authority	of	the	former,	even	when	we	find	some	particular	decision	intolerable.	(Talisse	2013)	Democracy,	he	thinks,	provides	the	best	conditions	for	epistemologically	warranted	faith	in	our	beliefs.	Hence,	he	believes,	we	have	epistemic	reasons	to	act	democratically.		These	reasons,	he	believes,	can	speak	as	powerfully	to	those	who	are	convinced	that	Roe	v.	Wade	licenses	mass-murder	as	to	those	for	whom	the	reversal	of	Roe	would	call	the	legitimacy	of	their	government	into	question.	(504)		Hence,	according	to	Talisse,	epistemology	can	provide	much-needed	support	for	democracy	at	those	times	when	we	confront	the	depth	of	the	moral	disagreements	amongst	us,	and	are	unable,	as	Rawls	had	hoped,	to	resolve	those	disagreements	through	a	shared	conception	of	justice.			This	is	a	challenging	and	ambitious	paper,	whose	subject	should	appeal	to	those	with	interests	in	communicative	ethics	as	well	as	political	theory.			It	is	ambitious,	because	it	seeks	to	use	very	minimal,	abstract	and	general	assumptions	about	people	as	epistemic	agents	in	order	to	generate	substantive	and	desirable	conclusions	about	political	morality.	For	that	reason	it	is	also	challenging,	because	it	appears	to	imply	that	quite	limited	and	uncontroversial	assumptions	about	epistemology	can	provide	support	for	democratic	politics	and	morality	in	ways	that	the	more	complex	and	controversial	constructions	of	Habermas	or	Rawls	cannot.		But	if	the	plausibility	of	Talisse’s	argument	lies	in	the	fact	that	popular	sovereignty	and	the	free	circulation	of	people	and	ideas	may	produce	distinctive	epistemic	goods,	its	difficulty	lies	in	the	possibility	that	democracies	may	also	face	distinctive	epistemic	problems.		For	example,	Tocqueveille	thought	that	democracies	were	particularly	good	at	correcting	mistaken	policies,	even	though	they	were	likely	to	produce	less	intelligent,	selfless	leaders	than	other	forms	of	government.		But	he	also	worried	about	the	effects	of	public	opinion	in	democracies,	and	its	power	in	a	society	where	people	seek	collective	agreement	and	see	each	other	as	free	and	equal.		So	it	is	by	no	means	clear	that	the	epistemologically	attractive	features	of	democracy	will	be	sufficient	to	sustain	a	project	like	Talisse’s.		The	aim	of	this	‘reply’,	therefore,	is	to	highlight	the	interest,	but	the	difficulties,	of	Talisse’s	short	article,	and	to	invite	him	to	elaborate	on	the	ambitions	and	critical	steps	of	his	argument	at	points	where	they	are	unclear	or	puzzling.	I	will	therefore	start	by	summarising	Talisse’s	epistemic	argument	for	democracy,	and	will	briefly	consider	its	conception	of	epistemic	agency	and	of	the	relationship	between	epistemology	and	democracy.			I	will	then	look	at	Talisse’s	conception	of	democracy.		
2		Talisse’s	Argument																																																	According	to	Talisse,	if	you	want	your	beliefs	to	be	true,	you	need	to	concern	yourself	with	your	‘cognitive	environment’,	because	only	some	cognitive	environments	favour	the	acquisition	of	true	beliefs.	Thus	if	we	want	our	beliefs	to	be	true	(and	we	want	them	to	be	true	not	as	a	matter	of	luck	or	good	fortune)	we	will	want	to	live	in	a	cognitive	environment	‘in	which	crucial	or	especially	powerful	evidence	with	respect	to	important	matters	would	emerge	and	be	widely	disseminated,	were	it	to	exist’.		(p.	510)	Talisse	assumes	that	we	care	about	the	epistemic	quality	of	our	beliefs,	because	we	take	the	things	we	believe	to	be	true,	or	at	any	rate,	‘when	we	believe,	we	aim	to	believe	what	is	true’.		(509)			There	is,	thus,	an	implicit	normative	claim	to	our	beliefs	–	the	claim	that	they	are	true	–	and	our	ability	to	make	good	on	this	normative	claim	requires	us,	so	Talisse	thinks,	not	just	to	show	that	our	beliefs	are	borne	out	by	the	evidence,	but	to	show	that	we	formed	them	in	an	environment		conducive	to	truth.	Such	a	cognitive	environment,	he	claims,	is	‘best	secured’	by	democratic	political	institutions,	(502)	because	unlike	the	institutions	of	open	but	undemocratic	societies,	democracy	enables	us	to	monitor	and	change	our	environment.		(516)		A	concern	for	truth,	according	to	Talisse,	therefore	commits	us	to	supporting	some	type	of	representative	and	parliamentary	government	that	is	democratic,	(517)	although	it	does	not	require	direct	democracy.	It	is	inconsistent	with	liberal	constitutional	arrangements	that	are	not	fully	democratic,	such	as	those	in	Britain	before	the	First	World	War,	or	with	some	republican,	but	undemocratic,	voting	arrangements	–	such	as	those	in	France	until	1945	or	Switzerland	until	1971.	The	reasons	why	epistemology	supports	democracy,	according	to	Talisse,	are	not	strictly	consequentialist,	or	a	result	of	Millian	considerations	about	the	advantages	of	freedom	of	expression,	(513),	though	he	thinks	they	are	consistent	with	Mill’s	arguments.		Rather,	what	he	aims	to	show	is	something	‘more	deontological’:	‘that	we	should	sustain	our	democratic	commitments	in	order	to	satisfy	the	obligations	that	are	internal	to	our	role	as	epistemic	agents.		Whether	a	democratic	social	order	also	promotes	truth	in	the	long	run	is	a	different	kind	of	question’.	(513)			Talisse’s	argument,	then,	can	be	summarised	as	follows:	even	when	people	find	‘the	strains	of	commitment’	too	great,	and	are	no	longer	convinced	of	the	legitimacy	of	their	governments,	they	have	reason	to	act	democratically	because	they	are	epistemic,	as	well	as	moral	and	political	agents.		(Rawls	1971,	para	25	+	29).		As	such,	they	have	interests	in	distinguishing	true	from	false	ideas,	and	of	doing	so	in	a	reliable	manner	and	on	their	own	initiative	rather	than	at	the	behest	or	with	the	permission	of	others.		Democracy	is	the	only	form	of	government	which	reliably	provides	the	appropriate	cognitive	environment	for	epistemic	agency.		Epistemic	considerations,	therefore,	can	support	democracy	even	when	moral	or	political	ones	fail.		Epistemic	Agency,	Morality	and	Politics		The	first	thing	to	note	about	this	argument	is	that	it	appears	fully	general,	and	to	apply	as	much	to	people	in	a	state	of	nature	or	to	those	who	live	in	undemocratic	forms	of	government	as	to	those	who	actually	live	in,	and	support,	democracy,	because	people	can	be	epistemic	agents	even	when	they	are	not	political	ones.		If	epistemic	agency	is	to	shore	up	faith	in	democracy,	(503)	it	is	essential	that	epistemic	agency,	and	the	norms	and	interests	associated	with	it,	apply	to	people	with	widely	differing	moral	and	political	beliefs	and	interests.		However,	democratic	pluralism	seems	to	depend	on	some	rather	specific	epistemic	premises	about	the	nature	and	limits	of	reason	and	its	distribution	across	human	agents.		So	a	first	puzzle	about	Talisse’s	article	is	the	nature	of	its	ambitions	and	the	fit	between	those	ambitions	and	its	premises,	given	the	universally	applicable	quality	of	the	latter,	but	the	highly	particular	goal	for	which	they	are	deployed.			Secondly,	and	relatedly,	the	abstract	norms	of	evidence-tracking	and	responsiveness	which	Talisse	identifies	with	epistemic	agency	have	a	rather	uncertain	fit	with	the	epistemic	norms	implicit	in	democratic	government.		As	the	former	have	to	justify	the	latter	and	not	merely	be	consistent	with	them,	it	would	be	helpful	to	know	whether	–	or	how	–	the	two	are	to	fit	together.		For	example,	one	reason	why	we	might	think	it	important	to	be	able	to	justify	our	beliefs,	and	to	show	that	they	are	the	product	of	an	environment	conducive	to	truth,	is	that	we	are	concerned	to	justify	our	beliefs	to	others	and,	in	particular,	to	justify	them	to	those	who	will	be	bound	by	the	decisions	that	we	make.		On	such	a	perspective	we	have	moral	and	political	reasons	to	care	about	the	evidence-tracking	
3		and	responsive	character	of	our	beliefs,	and	to	do	so	in	ways	that	reflect	the	nature	of	our	relationship	to	others	and,	our	relative	powers	and	responsibilities.	In	particular,	from	a	democratic	perspective,	it	seems	likely	that	the	epistemic	norms	of	verification	and	responsiveness	to	evidence	required	of	ordinary	people	will	be	very	much	less	than	those	required	of	the	powerful.	This	is	not	just	a	matter	of	the	frequency	or	the	publicity	with	which	one	shows	that	one	has	fulfilled	one’s	epistemic	duties,	but	the	nature	of	those	duties	themselves,	because	the	justification	for	collectively	binding	decisions	means	that	we	are	not	always	entitled	to	use	premises	about	the	just,	the	good,	the	true	or	the	useful	which,	in	other	circumstances,	we	are	entitled	to	depend	upon,	and	even	to	urge	on	others.		Thus,	a	democratic	conception	of	our	epistemic	duties,	rights	and	permissions	appears	to	demand	a	more	differentiated	conception	of	our	epistemic	agency	than	the	one	which	Talisse	provides.		It	is	not	wholly	clear	whether	–	or	how	–	we	can	get	from	the	one	to	the	other.			Before	turning	to	Talisse’s	conception	of	democracy,	it	is	worth	considering	a	third	aspect	of	Talisse’s	conception	of	epistemic	agency	namely,	the	relationship	between	the	norms	of	truth-seeking	implied	by	our	epistemic	agency,	and	the	moral	and	political	norms	associated	with	democracy.		Talisse’s	argument,	as	we	have	seen,	is	that	epistemic	agency	implies	(epistemic)	norms	of	evidence-tracking	and	evidence-sensitivity	which,	in	turn	‘entail’	support	of	democracy.		But	what	type	of	entailment	is	implied	by	Talisse’s	claim	that	‘our	commitment	to	sound	believing	and	proper	epistemic	practice	entails	a	commitment	to	a	democratic	social	order’	(512),	because	democracy	alone	adequately	‘supports	the	dialectical	and	institutional	social	epistemic	norms’	implicit	in	seeing	ourselves	as	people	who	care	about	the	truth	of	our	beliefs?			The	entailment	does	not	seem	to	be	psychological,	because	plenty	of	people	who	care	about	the	truth	of	their	beliefs	do	not	see	democratic	government	as	necessary	to	this,	or	even	as	particularly	desirable.		For	example,	if	we	accept	Tocquevillian	and	Millian	views	on	the	power	of	public	opinion	and	the	temptations	to	conformity	created	by	democratic	government,	we	might	lack	psychological	reasons	to	favour	democratic	government,	whatever	our	actual	beliefs	about	its	legitimacy.	However,	the	entailment	does	not	seem	to	be	logical,	either.		On	such	a	reading	of	Talisse’s	argument,	we	would	be	logically	committed	to	supporting	democratic	institutions	because	we	care	about	the	epistemic	quality	of	our	beliefs	even	if,	morally,	we	doubt	that	democratic	institutions	are	just.		This	would	imply	that	epistemic	norms	‘trump’	moral	norms,	whenever	the	two	conflict.	But	why	suppose	this,	and	how,	in	any	case,	can	such	an	assumption	be	squared	with	democratic	disagreements	over	the	importance	of	truth	to	politics?		Understanding	the	‘entailment’	between	epistemology	and	democracy	as	a	moral	one	is	more	plausible	and	seems	to	fit	with	Talisse’s	suggestion	that	he	is	providing	some	sort	of	deontological,	rather	than	consequentialist,	claim	about	epistemic	agency.	(506)		So	understood,	his	argument	is	that	epistemic	agency	implies	norms	of	evidence	tracking	and	responsiveness	which	require	us	morally	to	support	democratic	government,	even	when	we	otherwise	lack	moral	reasons	to	do	so,	or	are	unsure	of	their	weight.		However,	even	on	this	view	the	claim	that	epistemic	agency	entails	democracy	remains	puzzling,	because	it	appears	to	imply	that	people	should	care	more	about	tracking	truth	than	preventing	harm	to	others,	or	fostering	self-government.		But	morally	should	we	be	more	concerned	with	the	truth	rather	than	justice	or	self-government,	and	is	such	a	view	consistent	with	democracy?	Talisse’s	objections	to	philosopher	kings	and	to	‘open’	but	undemocratic	societies	do	not	seem	to	help	us	here,	because	they	do	not	illuminate	the	relative	importance	of	truth	and	self-government	to	democracies,	real	or	ideal.			Talisse’s	argument	for	democratic	institutions	-	as	opposed	to	the	best	of	the	alternatives	-	turn	on	the	idea	that	we	need	to	be	able	to	‘monitor’	our	cognitive	environment,	in	order	to	ensure	that	it	remains	conducive	to	evidence-tracking	and	responsiveness,	once	it	has	reached	that	state.		Platonic	kings	are	absolute	monarchs,	and	so	people	may	be	unable	to	monitor,	let	alone	to	change,	policies	that	affect	their	access	to	truth	and	their	ability	to	distinguish	it	from	falsehood.		So	too,	Talisse	thinks,	with	any	arrangements	that,	however	constitutional	and	liberal,	fall	short	of	democracy.		Hence,	he	believes,	our	duties	to	track	our	cognitive	environment	-and	our	interests	in	doing	so	-	give	us	compelling	reasons	to	favour	democratic	over	undemocratic	governments.	But	this	seems	to	overstate	my	epistemic	reasons	to	support	democracy,	even	if	we	abstract	from	the	question	of	whether	these	epistemic	reasons	would	work	if	concerns	for	justice,	equality,	freedom	and	self-government	fail	to	persuade	me.			My	faith	in	the	epistemological	qualities	of	my	environment	may	depend	on	what	rights	you	have,	rather	than	on	the	rights	that	I	have	myself.		A	commitment	to	moral	and	political	equality,	after	all,	does	not	require	us	to	suppose	that	we	are	all	equally	good	at	evaluating	the	epistemological	quality	of	beliefs,	let	
4		alone	equally	good	at	creating	epistemologically	warranted	beliefs.	Consistent	with	the	moral	reasons	to	favour	democratic	over	undemocratic	governments,	then,	I	may	think	that	we	would	do	at	least	as	well,	epistemologically	speaking,	if	you	had	political	rights	and	I	did	not;	or	if	you	have	two	political	votes,	whereas	I	only	have	one.		It	is	unclear	why	such	beliefs	would	be	unreasonable	or	inconsistent	with	a	concern	for	the	procedural	qualities	of	my	government	–	with	its	accountability	and	representativeness,	for	example.		Nor	is	it	clear	why	such	beliefs	must	be	at	odds	with	the	idea	that	democratic	governments	are	legitimate	in	the	ways	that	alternatives	are	not.		There	is	no	particular	reason	to	suppose	that	moral	or	political	arguments	for	democracy	must	proceed	via	claims	about	its	epistemic	superiority	to	other	forms	of	government.		So	why,	even	if	I	am	a	convinced	democrat,	must	I	value	political	accountability	and	representation	for	epistemic	reasons?		Why	cannot	I	value	them	despite	the	problems	that	they	pose	to	my	pursuit	of	truth?		Talisse’s	epistemic	argument	for	democracy,	then,	needs	further	clarification	of	its	assumptions	about	the	content,	relationship	and	priority	of	moral	and	epistemic	norms.	Talisse	is	right	that	the	epistemic	warrant	for	our	beliefs,	in	at	least	some	cases,	cannot	depend	on	the	evidence	we	currently	have,	but	on	our	reasons	for	thinking	that	we	have	had	access	to	the	relevant	evidence.		And	Talisse	is	right	that	we	should	therefore		be	concerned	with	the	procedural	as	well	as	the	substantive	aspects	of	government,	and	of	constitutions.		But	I	do	not	think	he	has	shown	that	we	must	therefore	favour	democratic	over	undemocratic	government	for	epistemic	reasons;	nor	why,	or	how,	we	are	to	do	so	once	we	doubt	that	democracy	is	morally	justified.		Democracy	Before	closing,	I	will	briefly	suggest	some	difficulties	with	Talisse’s	conception	of	democracy	and	his	way	of	distinguishing	democratic	from	undemocratic	actions	and	beliefs.		As	we	will	see,	these	reflect	the	tension	between	Talisse’s	desire	for	generalizability	and	universality	in	his	arguments	for	democracy	–	hence	his	concern	with	the	norms	implicit	in	epistemic	agency	as	such	–	and	his	recognition	that	there	are	different,	even	incompatible,	ways	to	be	democratic.		The	first	puzzle	concerns	Talisse’s	assumption	that	exile	cannot	be	a	democratic	response	to	grossly	unjust	acts	by	democratic	governments.	According	to	Talisse	‘Civil	Disobedience	and	Petition	represent	democratic	responses	[to	grave	injustice]	whereas	Relocation	and	Rebellion	do	not’.		(506).		What	makes	relocation	an	undemocratic	response	to	grave	injustice,	however,		is	not	clear,	even	if	one	notes,	as	Talisse	does,	that	‘Relocation	is	not	open	to	all	citizens,	and	under	certain	conditions	may	not	be	open	to	any’.		For	all	we	know,	the	same	might	be	true	of	civil	disobedience,	given	the	heavy	burdens	that	it	imposes	on	individuals	and	their	families¸	and	civil	disobedience	does	not	seem	to	be	an	intrinsically	democratic	form	of	action.	So	the	differences	between	CD	and	Relocation	are	not	obvious.		Must	democratic	political	action	be	available	to	everyone,	or	even	to	most	others?		Would	it	be	undemocratic	to	protest	grave	injustice	by	engaging	in	forms	of	symbolic	politics,	such	as	balancing	precariously	on	a	tightrope	at	great	heights,	because	it	would	be	unavailable	to	those,	like	me,	who	find	ladders	a	bit	of	a	challenge?		Is	‘internal	exile’,	of	the	sort	to	which	Judith	Shklar	refers,	an	undemocratic	response	to	grave	injustices	that	one	cannot	change	through	‘ordinary’	political	means?	(Shklar,	1998)	If	not,	why	must	exile	be	inconsistent	with	democratic	principles?		As	Talisse	says,	‘the	problem	of	justification	consists…in	preserving	the	voice	option	among	citizens	who	are	divided	at	the	level	of	fundamental	moral	loyalties’.		Clearly	relocation	and	internal	exile	are	insufficient	for	that,	but	that	hardly	means	that	they	are	not	consistent	with	democratic	principles,	or	are	undemocratic	responses	to	grave	injustice.		A	second	puzzle	is	why	democracy	is	supposed	to	be	sufficient	for	epistemological	norms,	even	when	necessary?		While	Talisse	maintains	that	we	need	mechanisms	of	monitoring	and	control,	he	says	nothing	about	such	things	as	collective	action	problems,	the	legacy	of	past	injustice	or	the	effects	of	international	developments	in	science	and	economics,	which	might	severely	constrain	our	ability	to	monitor	and	control	our	environments,	even	when	our	governments	are	democratic.		What	reason	have	we,	then,	to	suppose	that	democracy	is	sufficient	for	epistemic	agency	and,	if	it	is	only	one	amongst	many	necessary	factors,	what	weight	ought	we	to	accord	it?		Finally,	Talisse’s	conception	of	democracy	seems	to	take	some	form	of	liberal	representative	democracy	as	its	model	of	the	democratic	minimum	required	by	epistemic	norms	–	though	it	is	unclear	that	elections,	rather	than	lotteries,	are	necessary	for	democratic	government,	(Manin	1997)	however	important	they	are	to	democratic	forms	of	representative	government.		He	appears	to	suppose	that	
5		‘direct	democracy’	is	more	demanding	than	representative	democracy,	and	so	cannot	be	required	by	epistemic	arguments	for	democracy.		This	is	not	self-evident,	because	representative	democracy	is	a	complex	political	and	cultural	arrangement,	and	it	may	be	more	demanding	epistemically,	as	well	as	morally	and	politically,	than	other	forms	of	democracy.		In	any	case,	why	should	we	not	seek	the	optimal	form	of	democracy,	from	an	epistemic	view,	and	why	are	we	not	required	to	do	so	by	the	same	logic	that	commits	us	to	eschewing	governments	where	people	are	happy,	healthy,	wealthy	and	wise,	but	not	self-governing?		If	epistemic	norms	are	so	important	that	we	should	support	democracy,	why	do	they	not	require	a	specific	form	of	democracy	(for	example,	a	platonic	one,	rather	than	types	of	democracy	which	are	socialist,	utilitarian	or	Millian),	even	if	concerns	for	morality	might	lead	us	to	favour	another	democratic	arrangement?			Conclusion	Talisse’s	paper	appears	to	be	marked	by	a	tension	between	a	desire	for	universal	norms	that	would	support	democratic	government,	when	its	moral	virtues	are	least	evident,	and	acknowledgement	that	fundamentally	different	beliefs	can	be	reasonable	and	consistent	with	democratic	politics.		Evidence	of	this	tension	can	be	found	in	the	difficulty	of	pinning	down	the	relationship	between	morality	and	epistemology	he	has	in	mind,	as	well	as	the	difficulty	of	understanding	his	assumptions	about	democracy.		Reasonable	pluralism	means	that	there	are	a	potentially	infinite	number	of	ways	to	distinguish	democratic	and	undemocratic	governments,	and	advises	caution	in	claiming	too	much	for	any	one	of	these.		This	makes	it	hard	to	show	that	democracy	is	necessary	for	human	rights,	even	when	we	suppose	that	it	is	necessary	for	justice.	(Cohen	2006;	Christiano	2011;	Gilabert	2012;	Miller	forthcoming).	It	would	therefore	be	surprising	if	epistemic	differences	between	democratic	and	undemocratic	government	tell	decisively	in	favour	of	the	former,	and	against	the	best	of	the	latter.		(3,537	including	abstract,	refs	etc.).	----------------------------------------	Note	on	Contributor	Annabelle	Lever	is	Associate	Professor	of	Normative	Political	Theory	at	the	University	of	Geneva,	Switzerland.		Her	research	focuses	on	democratic	theory,	privacy,	sexual	and	racial	equality	and	intellectual	property.		She	is	the	author	of	On	Privacy	(Routledge,	2011)	and	the	editor	of	New	Frontiers	in	the	Philosophy	of	Intellectual	Property	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2012).		She	is	at	work	on	a	book,	tentatively	called,	A	Democratic	Conception	of	Ethics.			References	Cohen,	J.,	2006.	Is	there	a	human	right	to	democracy?	In	Christina	Sypnowich	ed.,	The	egalitarian	
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